X-X1814

CONFIDENTIAL

097.3
Z1092
No. 2374

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Research and Analysis Branch

R and A No. 2374

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE DIVISION
FILE COPY
PLEASE RETURN

PROBLEMS AND TRENDS IN FCNL COLONIAL POLICY

Description

A study of FCNL colonial action and principles presented against a background of pre-war policy as indicative of the possible nature of post-war French Empire organization.

25 September 1944

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 USC 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

53837

Copy No. 2

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE

The French Overseas Empire comprises various types of political dependencies. In addition to the colonies proper, it includes the protectorates of Morocco, Tunis, and those of the Indo-Chinese Union. Likewise it embraces the mandates of Togoland, the Cameroons, and until November 1943, Syria and the Lebanon. Algeria, although organized into three departments under the Ministry of Interior, is nevertheless administered by a colonial governor-general. This study which embraces the entire overseas Empire, utilizes the term "colony" to mean any type of territory dependent on a ruling power.

The study is restricted to the purely internal aspects of colonial rule and does not attempt the discussion of diplomatic issues confronting the Empire.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Summary	iv
I. Introduction	1
II. Pre-war Colonial Policy	2
A. Economic Policy	2
B. Political Policy	5
C. Native Policy	7
III. Factors and Influences in FCNL Colonial Action	13
A. The Increased Importance of the Overseas Empire	13
B. The Influence of the Vichy Interlude	14
C. Allied and Enemy Occupation and Propaganda	16
D. The Increase of "Leftist" Influence and Agitation	17
E. The Recrudescence of the North African Native Movements	19
F. Fear for the Security of the Empire	22
IV. Trends in FCNL Colonial Policy	26
A. Aims and Principles of FCNL Colonial Action	26
B. Trends in Political Policy	27
C. Trends in Native Policy	33
D. Trends in Economic Policy	42
V. Conclusion	45

Summary

1. In recent months, the FCNL has adopted measures and principles which indicate a change in the colonial policy which it inherited from the pre-war period. These expressions of a new colonial attitude are not definitive, however, and may be regarded only as trends indicating the nature of post-war Empire organization.

2. Pre-war colonial policy was based on theories of political, economic, and native assimilation which embraced the idea of the full integration of the colonies and colonial peoples into the life of France. Economically, the aim was Empire self-sufficiency, sought through the encouragement of a colonial agriculture complementary to Metropolitan production, and through the imposition of high tariff barriers to exclude foreign competition. The discouragement of colonial industrialization reflected the subordination of colonial interests to Metropolitan prosperity. Political control of the colonies was characterized by the centralization of authority in Paris. Local political institutions were patterned after those of France wherever practicable. Native policy, predicated in theory on the principle of assimilation, aimed at the creation of an elite group to assist in administration rather than the evolution of the native masses towards French standards of life and culture.

3. Several factors have operated to produce a change in FCNL attitudes towards the Empire. The course of the war has demonstrated the increased importance of colonies as strategic air and land routes, as sources of industrial as well as agricultural products and manpower. Innovations made by the Vichy regime probably have influenced FCNL colonial action. The Pétain Government advanced industrialization in North and West Africa. In Indo-China, it made

some progress in industrialization and in meeting native demands for closer association with administration. Enemy propaganda and occupation served to stir up native nationalist agitation in North Africa while subsequent Allied occupation of the same area brought hopes for the fulfillment of the Atlantic Charter. The maintenance of pre-war colonial policy has been rendered more difficult by the activities of "Leftist" groups such as the Communists, Socialists, France Combattante and the CGT. These groups have demanded a program looking towards the greater unity of the Empire and a policy of economic and political equality for the Arabs of North Africa. Finally, the recrudescence of North African native movements and the rise of fear for the security of the Empire have impelled the FCNL to take action in colonial matters.

4. The emphasis in FCNL colonial policy is primarily political and is designed to establish an Empire unity giving France the political and economic power necessary to regain its position as a world power. Its governing principle continues to be that of assimilation combined, in native affairs, with a policy of association according to which colonial development should be achieved through the joint cooperation of natives and Europeans within a framework ensuring respect for native traditions and institutions. No provision is made for colonial self-government; the possibility of a certain degree of autonomy is opened up only in economic matters.

5. The Brazzaville Conference and the declaration of 7 December 1943 to Indo-China pledge the FCNL to the creation of some sort of French Federation with a colonial assembly sitting at Paris. However, the administration of colonial affairs apparently will continue to be highly centralized

with some concessions made to decentralization in the form of an increase in the governors' powers. Brazzaville proposals indicate the creation of colonial assemblies elected by universal suffrage and endowed with the powers of the departmental conseils-généraux.

6. In native policy the ultimate goal appears to be assimilation with the possible exception of Indo-China. This aim is reflected in the Moslem ordinance of 7 March 1943, which extended French citizenship to several categories of Algerian Arabs. For the more backward possessions, education and the assumption of political responsibility through the medium of association are put forward as the most important means of conducting the natives towards French standards of civilization.

7. The most significant departures from pre-war policy are found in FCNL attitudes in economic matters. Customs personality, government-supervised industrialization, and cooperative agricultural enterprise are reforms advocated in the report of the Brazzaville Conference and pledged in the declaration to Indo-China.

8. The extent to which the future government of France attempts to implement the broad program of the FCNL will depend on the political complexion of the new Parliament and especially on the attitudes of Resistance groups which have given little expression to their colonial views.

PROBLEMS AND TRENDS IN FCNL COLONIAL POLICY

I. INTRODUCTION

The De Gaulle-Giraud accords which in June 1943, created the French Committee of National Liberation, likewise re-established the almost complete unity of the overseas Empire. French North and West Africa which, under the impulse of Allied invasion and diplomacy, came to recognize after November 1942 the successive authorities of Admiral Darlan and General Giraud, were joined with the colonies already administered by General de Gaulle's Fighting French. Under the pressure of these events as well as of continued economic distress, the pro-Pétainist regime of Admiral Robert in the Antilles collapsed and these colonies along with French Guiana rallied to the FCNL. Of the pre-1939 Empire, only Indo-China, which was an early victim of Japanese aggression, has remained beyond the authority of the Algiers Committee.

In administering this reintegrated Empire, the FCNL recently has adopted certain measures and principles which indicate, if not a reorientation, at least a new emphasis in the colonial practices and policy which it inherited from the pre-war Republic. However, the Algiers Committee has moved only with reluctance and with the greatest caution in colonial matters, due to the fear of creating dissension in Metropolitan and colonial circles as well as to the provisional character of its administration. Except where expediency has demanded immediate action, the Committee has insisted that specific proposals contained in declarations of principles must await the final approval of the government of liberated France. Moreover, FCNL expressions of a new colonial attitude have been confined, for the most part, to the various sections of the African Empire and only by

implication may they be extended to other overseas possessions. It is impossible, therefore, to discuss French colonial policy in definitive terms. At best, the actions of the FCNL in colonial matters may be regarded only as trends indicating the possible nature of post-war Empire organization and policies.

II. PRE-WAR COLONIAL POLICY

The colonial policy which the FCNL inherited from the pre-war period was based on the principle of assimilation, according to which the dependencies were to be endowed with the culture and with the political, economic, and social institutions of the Metropole to the point where they would become merely overseas extensions of France. Indeed, the colonial enthusiasts had long since ceased to designate the overseas possessions as "the Empire"; they spoke of France d'Outre-Mer. In actual practice, however, the ultimate aim of the assimilation policy in terms of the fusion of the dependencies into a greater France was lost in economic and political considerations which dictated a policy of colonial subordination to the Metropolitan France.

A. Economic Policy

French economic policy in the post-1919 period reflected the influence of World War I and the economic crisis following 1931. Added to the age-old interest of industrialists in the colonies as markets for surplus manufactured goods was the need for tropical products and raw materials which, in periods of national emergency, would relieve France of dependence on foreign sources. In accordance with Sarraut's mise en valeur idea,[1] the French colonies were encouraged to produce such materials as copra,

1. Sarraut, A., La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises, Paris, 1923.

ground nuts, cotton, rubber, and sisal, which would complement the agricultural efforts of the Metropole. While subsidies were granted for the cultivation of cotton in the Cameroons and in West and Equatorial Africa, large capital outlays were made for the production of rubber in Indo-China.[1]

To ensure the success of this mise en valeur complementaire, the tariff laws of 1928 were adopted. Except where international agreements demanded the maintenance of the "open door" policy, or where geographical considerations dictated a system of preferential rates, these enactments furthered the principle of tariff assimilation originally embodied in the legislation of 1892. High tariff walls, behind which free trade was exercised, were erected around the Metropole and the so-called "assimilated" colonies.[2] The economic crisis of 1931 and the years following served to encourage this tendency towards autarchy. In addition to maintaining the principles of free trade and preferential rates within the Empire bloc, an elaborate quota system which further restricted foreign imports was established.

Under the operations of this economic policy the colonial share in the totality of French imports increased from an average of 15.6 percent for the period 1921-1930, to 29.8 percent for the years 1931-1938.[3] It has been assumed, therefore, that in an era which witnessed an increasing tendency towards closed economic systems, the French policy benefited the colonies by assuring their produce a market, albeit a limited one.[4] In fact, however, colonial

1. Foreign Capital in Southeastern Asia, OSS 16191 (Restricted). "L'Harmonisation des Production Impériales," Revue Française d'Outre-Mer, April 1939: 115-117.
2. Haight, F. History of French Commercial Policy: 224-247. The "assimilated" dependencies included Algeria, Tunis, Indo-China, Madagascar, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guiana, and Réunion.
3. Haight, op. cit.: 263
4. Brogan, D. W. France under the Republic: 294.

prosperity was seriously impaired by this tariff policy, which subordinated the interests of dependencies to the attainment of French self-sufficiency. In some cases, the emphasis placed upon an agriculture complementary to that of France sacrificed colonial self-sufficiency in this area of economic activity and forced the dependencies to rely on outside markets for foodstuffs which could have been produced at home.[1] The policy of tariff assimilation and preferential rates, particularly in the Pacific colonies, had the effect of diverting trade from natural channels offered by neighboring countries.[2] Above all, the discouragement of colonial industry in the interests of Metropolitan industrialists and merchants prevented the development of a better balanced colonial economy, the gains from which probably would have been far more profitable than those derived from a trade restricted largely to France.[3]

The system had especially adverse effects on the native populations in the colonies. The financial benefits derived by large scale planters in the possessions, and by those groups in France whose income was based on the colonial trade, were at the expense of natives who labored for wages ranging from ten to thirty cents a day.[4] Moreover, the failure to introduce industrialization into the dependencies perpetuated a widespread condition of native unemployment, particularly in North Africa. With the handicraft industry ruined by factory competition and with the inability of agricultural enterprise to absorb the landless masses, the Indo-Chinese and North African labor markets were glutted. In the years preceding the outbreak of the war, this jobless

1. CID 59226, 1 Dec. 1943.
2. Smyth, J.H. "France's Role in Indo-China," Living Age, April 1941: 125-129.
3. CID 21542, 10 March 1942. Civil Affairs Handbook, French China, Section 8: 13ff.
4. OSS 43674, 11 Sept. 1943, CID 52573, 10 Jan. 1942.

proletariat, under the inspiration of intellectual leaders, showed a tendency to turn to anti-capitalist as well as to anti-French agitation as a means of escape from their economic plight.[1]

B. Political Policy

Due mostly to the vagaries of earlier historical development, the political relations between France and the overseas Empire in the pre-war period presented a curious and often confusing mixture of real assimilation and domination by the mother country. The assimilation principle was carried farthest in Algeria which, since 1871, has enjoyed departmental status and has sent several deputies and senators to the Metropolitan Parliament.[2] Likewise, the Antilles, Réunion, and the French Indies were represented in both Senate and Chamber of Deputies, while Senegal, French Guiana, and Cochin-China elected deputies to the lower body only. Protectorate or mandate treaties precluded political assimilation for Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, and the Lebanon. The remainder of the Empire was submitted to a regime of outright domination.

Like the French departments, the overseas possessions, with the exception of the North African protectorates and the Syrian mandates, were governed according to the principle of legislative centralization. Depending on its particular status, as determined by the degree of assimilation, each dependency was governed by decrees or laws emanating directly from Paris. Even Morocco and Tunisia, whose protectorate treaties assured legislative decentralization through the respective governments of Sultan and Bey, were administered for the most part by the French Ministry of

1. Priestly, H. France Overseas; 154-155, 234-240.
2. Liebesny, H. The Government of French North Africa: 83.

Foreign Affairs operating through the residents general. The assimilated colonies had general or colonial councils patterned on the departmental model and empowered to deal with the budget, public works, etc. Due to the particular features of local administration, these budgetary functions in Algeria were performed by the Délégations Financières. In Tunis and Morocco, the Grand Council and the Conseil de Gouvernement elected by French citizens and the natives performed these functions.[1] In the remainder of the colonies, local administration was in the hands of a governor assisted by an administrative council which was elected by Chambers of Commerce composed of French citizens, and by native notables. The powers of the councils, organized on the French West Africa model, were mostly advisory.[2]

The pre-war political policy of France in the overseas possessions, presented several deficiencies from the point of view of its operation and its avowed principle of assimilation. The Empire, whose population, excluding the Levant States, totalled more than 65 million as compared with 42 million for the Metropole, was represented by only 20 deputies out of a total of 618 in the Chamber and most of these came from the smaller colonies. There was no single authority for the administration of the dependencies. The protectorates of Morocco and Tunis together with the Near Eastern mandates were administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Algeria, half colony and half department, was governed through the Ministry of Interior. The colonies proper were controlled by the Ministry of Colonies. Programs for the partial or complete co-ordination of the administrative machinery through a Ministry of France

1. Liebesny, H., op. cit. 45, 63.
2. Buell, R. The Native Problem in Africa, Vol. 1: 928, 967.

d'Outre-Mer, the Commission Ministériale des Affaires Musulmanes and the Haut Comité Méditerranéen et de l'Afrique du Nord had been failures.[1] Moreover, there was little disposition to take into account the varied problems of the particular dependency nor was there an effective agency to assist the Paris authorities in legislating intelligently on colonial matters. The Conseil Supérieur de la France d'Outre-Mer, composed of colonial senators and deputies and other appointive and elective officials was a purely advisory body and generally ineffective.

C. Native Policy

The least successful and, therefore, the most criticized of the pre-war colonial policies of France was that of assimilation as applied to the native masses. The idea of conducting the political, social, and cultural evolution of indigenous colonial masses along lines which would lead to eventual enjoyment of the suffrage and citizenship rights of Frenchmen did not arouse hostility among a people entirely lacking in color prejudice. Under the inspiration of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century revolutionary fervor, the natives of the Anciennes Colonies (Martinique, Guadeloupe, Réunion, etc.) and of Senegal were granted full citizenship rights with the privilege of electing representatives to the Parliament at Paris. Since 1848, this mass enfranchisement of native populations had ceased. Under the Third Republic, however, individual natives of all the French possessions including Morocco and Tunis were eligible to acquire citizenship rights by fulfilling certain conditions such as ability to read, write, and speak French fluently, the performance of a prescribed period of military service, and the relinquishment

1. Montagne, R. "Comment Organiser Politiquement l'Empire Français." Politique Etrangère, April 1938: 125-129.

of any specialized status arising from tribal or religious organization.[1]

While espousing the general principles of assimilation, the Third Republic subordinated its broader aspects to the more immediate aim of creating a native elite to assist in administration and to serve as a medium for the propagation of French culture. The limited educational facilities of the colonial possessions were directed to the establishment of this privileged group which stood midway between the citizenship class and the native masses. In addition to occupying minor administrative posts, the elite was entitled to elect a certain number of native representatives to the various administrative councils and, in the North African possessions, to the various bodies which performed the functions of budgetary approval.[2] In all of these councils, however, the delegates of the native subjects were always inferior in number to those of the French citizens.

The great mass of natives living according to tribal customs were left untouched by "assimilation." For the most part, they lived in artificially created tribal organizations erected to replace the shattered originals and administered by native officials selected from the elite group. These were the caids, bachaghas, the kadis in Algeria, and the native chiefs in other sections of the Pacific and African Empire.[3] Acting as agents of the government rather than as representatives of the people, these officials were charged with the preservation of order and with the collection of

1. Liebesny, op. cit., 39, 66. CID 54096, 2 Dec. 1943.
2. Wieschoff, H. Colonial Policies in Africa: 94-95. CID 52574, 10 Jan. 1942.
3. Survey of French West Africa, R and A 75. CID 45345, 10 Sept. 1943.

various taxes including the prestation. The latter obligation, payable in work or money, for the impoverished native was only a system of forced labor effectively used for the construction of public works.[1] While the administration of criminal justice remained in the hands of French officials, civil justice was applied in native courts on the basis of customary law. In addition, French administrators exercised the powers of the indigénat, a much-hated section of the native code which allowed the imposition of penalties for crimes and misdemeanors not covered by law.[2]

With emphasis placed on the constitution of an elite group, the assimilation policy in terms of the progress of the native masses towards French culture did not advance very far. This was not due entirely to the impossible application of ideological concepts of barbarian virtues as has been asserted.[3] The success of such a program demanded enormous expenditures for education which the French apparently had little desire to make. Thus, in French West Africa prior to 1939, only 3.69 percent of school-age children were provided with educational facilities while in Morocco where 5 percent of the population is said to be literate, only 2 percent of the budget was allocated to education. Inadequate instruction was provided for Algerian children between eight and thirteen years of age.[4]

In North Africa and in Indo-China there was considerable opposition to assimilation among natives steeped

1. Survey of French West Africa, R and A 75: 44. CID 52573, 10 Jan. 1942.
2. Priestly, op. cit., 268.
3. Roberts, S. History of French Colonial Policy, Vol. 1: 102. Brogan, op. cit., 102.
4. Survey of French West Africa, R and A 75: 49. CID 43674, 11 Sept. 1943. CID 54540, 4 Apr. 1943.

in ancient cultures which had lost their flexibility and receptivity to new ideas. Resistance to assimilation and foreign control in the years following World War I led to the development of various nationalist movements. In Indo-China, the Parti Révolutionaire du Nouvel Annam, the Association des Jeunesses Révolutionaires Annamites, and Parti Nationaliste Annanite combined with Communist-inspired organizations to create frequent disturbances.[1] Among the Arabs of the North African protectorates, Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arabic doctrines underlay the anti-French movements. The "Young Moroccans" agitated for a reform program the ultimate aim of which was the restoration of national sovereignty under the Sultan. In Tunis, the Destour and Neo-Destour Parties, the respective adherents of Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arabic theories, presented the most advanced of the North African movements for the abolition of French control.[2]

In Algeria, the native problem was complicated by the presence of a European population of nearly a million. Many of these were descendants of the early French settlers who had profited from the dispossession of Arab tribes to build up large feudal estates and whose wealth was based primarily on the systematic exploitation of a cheap native labor supply. These Algerian colons vigorously opposed the various native movements which developed in the decade immediately preceding 1939. In these native movements, two distinct attitudes towards France were reflected. Certain organizations such as the Société des Oulémas (Association of "Wisemen") and the Etoile Nord Africaine (now the Parti Populaire Algérien) were definitely imbued with independence aspirations based on Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arabic ideology.

1. Priestly, op. cit., 235 ff.
2. For the pre-war native movements in North Africa, see Native Nationalism in French North Africa, R and A 1693, 20 May 1944: 8-26.

Others like the Fédération des Elus Musulmans, which contained the greater number of Arab intellectuals, and the Marabouts, a sect of unorthodox Moslems which wielded considerable influence in native circles, sought closer cooperation with France in the form of full citizenship with the retention of their Moslem status.[1] When the Popular Front Government in 1937 introduced the Blum-Violette project incorporating such a program for a few elite categories, even the Société des Oulémas joined the Fédération des Elus Musulmans and the Marabouts in supporting the legislation. However, the Algerian colons through their representatives in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies opposed the measure so violently that it was withdrawn.[2] As a rusult even the pro-French intellectuals were driven to the more extreme demand for autonomy. Nevertheless, on the outbreak of the war, the natives of Morocco and Tunis as well as Algeria professed their loyalty to France.[3]

In the decade preceding the outbreak of war, there were some evidences that the French Government was abandoning the policy of assimilation for that of "association." According to this principle, colonial development should be achieved through the mutual cooperation of natives and Europeans within a framework which ensures both respect for native traditions and institutions and progressive development along European lines.[4] This principle, already operative in some parts of Indo-China, was discernible in certain phases of West African administration.[5] However, its application here was not entirely divorced from assimilation tendencies.

1. ISIS, Report on Algeria, CID 23197, Aug. 1942. Montagne, R., "La Fermentation des Partis Politiques en Algerie," Politique Etrangère, Apr. 1937: 124-140.
2. ISIS, Report on Algeria, CID 23197, Aug. 1942.
3. CID 54546, 24 Apr. 1943.
4. Roberts, op. cit. 111ff.
5. Priestly, op. cit. 277.

In clinging more or less tenaciously to the policy of assimilation, the French probably regarded it as the most suitable means of achieving the military aim of their colonial policy -- the acquisition of the manpower necessary to maintain France as a great power in the face of a declining Metropolitan birth rate. World War I had taught the efficacy of using colonial troops. In the years preceding World War II, the principle of colonial conscription was pursued with added vigor.[1] It was of fundamental importance that the loyalty of such a significant segment of the army be maintained and not the least efficacious method was the inculcation of the idea that the natives were Frenchmen and that their homeland constituted a part of France.

1. Buell, R. The Native Problem in Africa, Vol. 2: 3 ff.

III. FACTORS AND INFLUENCES IN FCNL COLONIAL ACTION

That French authority in the overseas Empire has thus far survived the disruptive influences of military defeat and political discord which, at one time, saw the dependencies divided among three rival groups, attests to the fact that the pre-war colonial policy of France probably was as effective as that of any other imperial power. The highly centralized form of administration utilized in colonial government proved beneficial to anti-Vichy forces after the Armistice. In most of the possessions, the ralliement to pro-Allied groups was largely the work of a handful of officials who, thanks to the strong central authority in colonial administration, were able to control the allegiance of the dependencies. Even the limited application of the much-maligned assimilation principle which underlay native administration has paid dividends in the form of continued loyalty of colonial troops. Nevertheless, the reintegration of the overseas Empire has taken place under conditions which have rendered difficult attempts to return to pre-war policies.

A. The Increased Importance of the Overseas Empire

The course of the war has demonstrated to the French the importance of their colonial holdings for strategic land and air routes. It has also emphasized the desirability of exploiting to the full the industrial as well as the agricultural potentialities of their possessions. For its independent war effort, the FCNL has had to rely on an Empire whose economic development leaves much to be desired. The strength of the Algiers Committee, however, has been that of the overseas possessions. The divisions which fought under the French flag in North Africa and which, at present, are distinguishing themselves in the Italian

campaign, are composed largely of native colonial troops.[1] Moreover, it is colonial production on which the FCNL has relied for the stockpiling which will represent the French contribution to the supply of liberated France.[2] Insofar as it has been able to pay its own way, the Algiers Committee has been provided the means through the taxes and voluntary contributions of the overseas Empire.[3] It was in recognition of this support that, in the final allocation of seats in the Consultative Assembly, the FCNL awarded twenty to the dependencies.[4] It recognized, however, that this action was only an expedient and that the new strategic and economic importance of the Empire demanded a more far-reaching program of colonial revision.

B. The Influence of the Vichy Interlude

With the exception of French Equatorial Africa, the Cameroons, New Hebrides, and New Caledonia, which rallied to the Free French in the two or three months immediately following the Armistice, the colonies and dependencies of France had been under the control of Vichy for periods of varying length. Vichy not only extended to the Empire the totalitarian principles and institutions already adopted in the Metropole, but also was compelled to make innovations which anticipate much of the development reflected in FCNL colonial attitudes and actions.[5] The dislocation of French industry and the British blockade brought home to the Pétain Government the necessity of encouraging colonial industrial production formerly curtailed by Metropolitan fears of competition. According to reports, several large textile mills, equipped with machinery brought from France and utilizing domestic wool, were established in

1. The New York Times, 6 Jan. 1944.
2. CID 54524, Dec. 1943. CID 58254, 12 Feb. 1944.
3. JORF, 5 Jan. 1944, 12 Feb. 1944.
4. The Political Background of the Membership of the French Consultative Assembly, R and A. 1166.
5. CID 25766, 21 Nov. 1942.

the North African dependencies. In Morocco and Algiers, plants were constructed for the production of matches, soap, and vegetable oils. French West Africa turned to the large-scale manufacture of oil from ground nuts formerly shipped in the shell to external markets. Likewise, under Vichy direction, establishments for the processing of tapioca and cocoa were encouraged in this area.[1] In the field of agriculture and commerce, the Pétain regime endeavored to push the pre-1939 projects for irrigating the Niger Valley in the interest of increased cotton production and for the construction of a Transsaharan railway linking French West Africa with the North African territories. A late start and an acute shortage of materials rendered these efforts ineffectual.[2]

In Indo-China, the sole colony which today recognizes its authority, the Vichy Government, represented by Admiral Découx, has made radical revisions in pre-1939 policy in an endeavor to maintain French influence and prestige in the face of Japanese military control. Customs autonomy, a measure long sought by Annamite business leaders as a solution of the region's economic ills, was granted in August 1940. At the same time, Admiral Découx has encouraged industrialization which may prove to be the answer to the long-standing unemployment problem.[3] More important for the immediate aim of regaining the confidence of native leaders has been the program for the closer integration of the dominant Annamite group into the administration of the colony. A series of decrees has opened to the natives many of the lower administrative posts such as secretaries and inspectors in the

1. CID 21542, 10 Mar. 1942. CID 19428, 25 July 1942. CID 54546 24 Apr. 1943. Townroe, B.S. "French Colonies in 1943;" Asiatic Review, July 1943: 328.
2. JOEF, 27 May 1941: 2203-2204. CID 11120, 5 Feb. 1942.
3. JOEF, 25 Oct. 1940; 5422. PW Weekly No. 36, 7 Jan. 1944: 19-21

various departments and justices of the peace.[1] In November 1943, Admiral Découx appointed Annamites to the high administrative positions of Director of the Department of Labor and Chief Director of Economic Affairs.[2]

The revisions which Vichy made in certain phases of pre-war colonial policy in Africa and which it is continuing in Indo-China have served to emphasize the conservative nature of French colonial administration, under the Third Republic, and probably have impressed the Free French authorities with the necessity of formulating principles for the future development not only of Indo-China but also of other sections of the Empire.

C. Allied and Enemy Occupation and Propaganda

Another factor influencing FCNL action has been the effects of Allied and enemy occupation and propaganda in North Africa. With the invasion of November 1942, Italo-German propaganda turned with renewed vigor to the task of arousing native nationalist movements which had been quiescent since the Armistice. The Axis effort was particularly effective in Tunis where Sidi Moncef, the reigning Bey, apparently was encouraged to ally himself with the revived Destour parties in taking measures to undermine the French protectorate.[3] Although Sidi Moncef paid with his throne for his alleged rash action, the few months of liberation from the more repressive features of French control had had their effect on native ambitions.

In Morocco and Algeria, however, it was the Allied occupation which provided the incentive to native aspirations.

1. JOEF, 28 Feb. 1942: 861; 19 May 1942: 1826; 18 Feb. 1943:477.
2. Civil Affairs Handbook, French Indo-China, Section 9, 16 May 1944: 58.
3. The New York Times, 16 May 1943.

The Allied armies brought with them hopes for the fulfillment of the Atlantic Charter and for better things to come.[1] Of much greater immediate importance was the effect of the American occupation in changing the long-established economic pattern of native life. In the early weeks of the invasion, American military authorities, badly in need of labor, paid wages to the natives far in excess of what they were accustomed to receive.[2] Although the Americans later reduced the wage scale to figures more in keeping with North African practices, the natives could not easily be induced to return to the old system.[3] The activities of "Leftist" organizations whose members were recent arrivals from the Metropole made such a return increasingly difficult.

D. The Increase of "Leftist" Influence and Agitation

In matters affecting the Metropole as well as the colonies, the attitude of the FCNL has become increasingly shaped by "Leftist" influences. These influences, reflected in the Tixier program for the social reconstruction of France, have made themselves felt in North Africa through such organizations as the Communist and Socialist parties, France Combattante and the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT).[4] In conducting arduous campaigns for native membership, these groups have espoused a program of far-reaching social and political reform. Founded by the joint action of the Communist Party and the rightist group, Combat, for the purpose of consolidating support for De Gaulle and his efforts, France Combattante has put forward the following platform for native reforms:

1. Christian Science Monitor, 19 May 1943.
2. CID 41900, 18 Aug. 1943.
3. CID 41900, 18 Aug. 1943.
4. Prospects of FCNL Social Policy, R and A 2172, 31 May 1944.

1. Equal salary with Europeans for equal work.
2. Equal army pay and allowances.
3. Application to Moslems of all social legislation, pre- and post-war.
4. Freedom of education including the teaching of Arabic.
5. Improvement in native housing, hygiene, and social conditions.
6. Syndical rights for Moslems.
7. Full political rights.
8. Agrarian reform in terms of land for the landless.[1]

Comprising the most active party after the Communists, the Socialists have established a program which, much more guarded in its expressions on native political rights, advocates social measures similar to those of France Combattante.[2] In Tunisia as well as in Algeria, the syndical unions of the CGT have favored the integration of the Arabs into the present and future social programs devised for labor.[3] Even the Radical and Radical Socialist parties have joined their voices to the general clamor, their recent Congress demanding the uplift of the Moslems and the admission of natives into higher administrative positions. More specifically this Congress suggested the sequestration of all Italian property in Tunis for allocation to Arab peasants after the war.[4]

The activities of the Communist Party have made difficult the continuance of the existing native policy in North Africa. In building up a strong native membership in Tunis and Morocco, it has lent some support to native aspirations for autonomy if not for independence. Moslems, many of whom belong to the Destour organization, are said

1. CID 35133, 10 Apr. 1943.
2. CID 65470, 15 Mar. 1944.
3. CID 51657, 13 Nov. 1943.
4. OSS 34247, 21 June 1944.

to make up 40 percent of the Tunisian Communist Party.[1] It is doubtful, however, that the Communists will countenance the disruption of the Empire. Like the other "Leftist" parties, they have sought only to impress upon the FCNL the need for a "bold Moslem policy associating French unity with the unity of the whole Empire's population."[2]

E. The Recrudescence of the North African Native Movements

Absorbed in problems arising from the war effort, the approaching liberation of France, and its own efforts to secure recognition from Allied partners, the FCNL would have preferred to postpone all discussion of colonial reform until the end of hostilities and the establishment of the new government in liberated France. However, the recrudescence of the North African native movements and dangers, real or imaginary, to the security of the Empire from within, compelled the Algiers authorities to take some immediate action in colonial matters.

In the period between the Armistice of 1940 and the Allied invasions of more than two years later, there was little evidence of native nationalist agitation in North Africa. In view of the ardent and often violent movements of the immediate pre-war years and the weakened condition of France after the Armistice, this quiescent situation was remarkable. Its existence may be attributed partially to a "wait-and-see" attitude on the part of Arab leaders. So, too, it may be that Vichy principles were not without some appeal to the native masses. Much emphasis has been placed on the anti-Semitic sentiment prevalent among indigenous groups. While this sentiment is undoubtedly strong, there is evidence

1. AFHQ, PWB, North African Survey, 9 Oct. 1943.
2. Liberté, 26 Aug. 1943.

that the application of anti-Jewish legislation evoked considerable protest from influential native leaders in Tunis and Algeria.[1] The appeal of Vichy legislation for the indigenous element may be found, perhaps, in the impression which it gave of a more complete equality of native with European. To the Arab masses, whose share in the political and economic benefits of French democracy was never such as to make avowedly autocratic principles abhorrent, the suspension of the franchise and the substitution of appointive advisory bodies for elected assemblies removed the most potent reminders of their inferiority. Moreover, in appointing four Moslem members to the Conseil National, the advisory body to the Chief of State, the Vichy Government recognized the claim of the native Algerian population to representation in the central authority.[2] In addition, the forced labor exacted from Frenchmen in the Metropole for German masters and from continental refugees in the colonies for the construction of the Transsaharan railway brought Europeans into a system formerly reserved for natives and thereby gave added color to the impression of equality.[3]

With the Allied invasion of North Africa and the German occupation of Tunis, however, the flood gates of native agitation were thrown open.[4] While strong evidence of Arab collaboration with the Germans allowed the French to take repressive measures in Tunis, the Algerian agitation reached disquieting proportions. Anticipating the re-establishment of the pre-war system which ensured the domination of the colons, the Fédération des Elus Musulmans launched a series of demands. In February 1943, the

1. CID 16958, Mar. 1942. Washington Post, 14 Nov. 1942.
2. JOEF, 25 Mar. 1941: 1299.
3. Raphael, A.C. "Dakar and the Desert Road," Political Science Quarterly, March 1944: 15-19.
4. For post-1942 native agitation see Native Nationalism in French North Africa, R and A No. 1693: 27-49.

"Manifesto of the Algerian People" condemned the principle of colonization and demanded, among other things, the immediate participation of the Moslem Arabs in the government of the country and a constitution guaranteeing the right of self-determination, the confiscation of the great landed estates of the colons, and the equality of all groups of the population.[1] Later in May, Ferhat Abbas, one of the outstanding Moslem Leaders, placed before General Giraud a plan for a mixed commission of Europeans and Arabs to govern Algeria. The central feature of this program was a project for the creation of two governor-generals, one European to administer the affairs of the dependency as a whole, and the other, Arab, to supervise native affairs.[2] The rejection of these demands only stimulated the Moslems to more vigorous action.

On inheriting the North African difficulties in June 1943, the FCNL established a special Commissariat of Moslem Affairs and entrusted its administration to General Catroux. On the suggestion of the latter, a series of decrees was issued granting the Moslems minor concessions such as the equalization of military pay (but not of dependency benefits), the opening of some lower administrative posts formerly closed to them, and the simplification of naturalization procedures.[3] Encouraged by the growing support of the "Leftist" groups, the Arab leaders rejected these concessions as mere palliatives and showed their resentment by boycotting the October session of the Délégations Financières, thereby impeding the operation of the

1. CID 44470, 23 Aug. 1943.
2. OSS 14475, 27 Oct. 1943. CID 35133, 10 Oct. 1943.
3. JORF, 12 Aug. 1943: 64-65.

Algerian financial system.[1] General Catroux replied by dissolving the Moslem section of the budgetary body and arresting two of the Arab leaders.

The growing influence of the radical parties and their encouragement of native aspirations made it difficult to enforce such strong measures. As Catroux's action in Algeria was soon nullified by higher authorities, so, too, was that of General Mast in Tunisia where he had arrested the native secretary of the Communist Party for criticizing the Arab and economic policy of the Administration as being worse than that of the Germans.[2] With the reinstatement of the Crémieux Laws enacted in 1871 to give citizenship to the native Jews of Algeria, and with the sudden collapse of French authority in the Levant States, the FCNL found it impossible to delay reform any longer. These events stimulated native agitation from Tunis to Morocco. Even the underground press in France, which rarely took cognizance of Empire affairs, commented on the situation. L'Humanité, an organ of the Communist underground, declared that events in Syria "demonstrated the necessity of practicing a policy of broad understanding as regards the indigenous population of North Africa and the satisfaction of their legitimate demands in such a way as to unite all forces of the Empire in a reinvigorated struggle against the Hitlerian enemy."[3]

F. Fear for the Security of the Empire

In addition to making imperative a revision of Moslem policy in North Africa, the collapse of French authority in the Levant States gave rise to fears for the post-war integrity of the Empire. The Near East debacle came as the result of a Free French pledge, given in 1941 at the time of the British invasion, to take immediate steps to establish Syrian and

1. OSS 14475, 27 October 1943.
2. OSS 14475, 27 October 1943.
3. L'Humanité, 1 December 1943.

Lebanese independence.[1] After waiting for two years for the implementation of this pledge, and probably disconcerted by the growing French power under the FCNL, the Lebanese decided to take matters into their own hands. Through a revision of the constitution that omitted all reference to the authority of France and the League of Nations, the Lebanon proclaimed its independence in November 1943. With a show of force, Jean Helleu, the French delegate-general responded to this unilateral action by dissolving the Lebanese Parliament and arresting its leaders. The French representative as well as the FCNL was dismayed, however, when the British and American Governments came to the aid of the Lebanon. Under the pressure of these two governments, the Algiers authorities were compelled not only to recall the Parliament and to reinstate its chiefs but also to send General Catroux to Beirut to negotiate the instruments through which both the Syrian and Lebanese governments were to accede to the functions formerly exercised by the French.[2]

The British and American action alarmed the French who saw in it a threat to the future security of the Empire. Like Syria and the Lebanon, most of the French possessions are occupied by British and American troops. Moreover, the entire overseas Empire is economically dependent on the two Allied countries. By a convention of January 1941, French India has been incorporated into a customs union with the British Indies; Oceania is experiencing a measure of prosperity due to American purchases of its phosphates, copra, and vanilla; and New Caledonia finds a ready market for its products in Australia as well as in the United States. The African possessions and the Caribbean colonies are dependent on the markets and

1. JOFL, 1-2 July 1941: 29-30.
2. OSS 24900-S, 12 November 1943. OSS 25251, 22 November 1943. Airgram, Beirut, 2 February 1944.

shipping facilities of the two Allies for their imports and exports.[1] In view of this military and economic situation, it is not surprising that in the months immediately following the Syrian affair,, the Algiers political authorities became increasingly fearful concerning the fate of the overseas Empire.

Moreover, there was considerable evidence that both natives and French citizens were becoming pessimistic over the future of the Empire. In view of the Chinese seizure of the Indo-China-Yunnan Railway and the Kuomintang's activities which evidently look forward to the post-war annexation of that colony, some Frenchmen were beginning to concede the loss of the "pearl of the Empire" to the Far Eastern partner of the Allies.[2] Then, too, the weakened condition of continental France betokened a long and difficult period of reconstruction. Impressed by the show of American economic power and little desirous of sharing the trials and tribulations of French rehabilitation, some native leaders were giving expression to a desire for United States' control.[3]

General Jan Smuts' famous speech of 3 December which contained the statement that "France has gone and will be gone in our day and perhaps for many a day" was little calculated to alleviate French fears or to restore confidence in French destiny.[4]

More than any other contributing factor, it was this situation which led the FCNL to take up the question of colonial reform. The Empire now appeared as the basis of any future French greatness and its importance could no longer be disregarded. Hence, the FCNL summoned the Brazzaville African

1. Document Series II, No. 752 E, 29 March 1944. PW Weekly, 14 January 1944: 16-19.
2. CID 42018, 28 August 1943. CID 45865, 24 August 1943.
3. OSS 23404, Dakar Cable, 5 February 1944.
4. The New York Times, 4 December 1943.

Conference. Restricted to colonial governors, observers from the North African possessions, and a few representatives of the Algiers Provisional Administration, this Conference was to explore the bases of a colonial reform program for the African colonies. At the same time, the Conference was designed to impress United Nations' leaders with the continued vitality of France and her determination to remain a great power. If the scope of the Conference was limited to Africa, it was only because the discussion of that section of the Empire presented fewer possibilities of friction and misunderstanding. Nevertheless, many of the recommendations made at Brazzaville are Empire-wide in their anticipated application.

IV. TRENDS IN FCNL COLONIAL POLICY

A. Aims and Principles of FCNL Colonial Action

In contrast to pre-war policy which was based on economic and military considerations subordinating the interests of the overseas possessions to those of the Metropole, the emphasis in FCNL colonial action is primarily political. The Algiers authorities look forward to the establishment of an Empire unity which will ensure a parallel development of France and the colonies in such a way as to give the French Empire the political and economic strength necessary to maintain a position among the world powers equal to that of the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and the United States. In the attainment of this aim, the FCNL has stressed the closer association of the overseas possessions in Empire Government, the broader development of colonial economy, and a native policy that will re-emphasize the existence, as a compact unit, of one hundred and five million Frenchmen rather than the forty-four million confined to the homeland.

At the present time, the principles destined to govern colonial development along these lines present some contradictions. While great stress is placed on the policy of association, it appears that the ultimate goal is assimilation especially as regards the native masses. According to Henri Hoppenot, head of the French delegation to the United States, the "future of the French Colonial Empire lies in the direction of making the natives of certain French colonies Frenchmen in the full sense of the word (and not merely proteges without the rights of citizenship) and of bringing other colonies to self-government within the Empire along Federalist lines."[1] There is little likelihood, however, that French colonial policy anywhere will take on a self-government tinge. The first principle which was enunciated by the colonial

1. "The Future of France," Free World, May 1944: 424-439.

governors at the Brazzaville African Conference -- and which probably reflects the general attitude on this point -- states: "The aims of civilization accomplished by France in the colonies exclude any idea of autonomy, any possibility of evolution outside of the French bloc of the Empire; the possible constitution, even in the distant future, of self-government in the colonies is to be dismissed."[1] Under the FCNL, colonial action has been predicated on what M. René Pleven, Commissioner of Colonies, describes as the desire of the colonies to see the "political power of France exercised with precision and vigor in all the territories where our flag flies."[2] However, within these limits the Algiers Committee seems inclined to grant a certain amount of administrative and economic decentralization that presents a contrast with pre-1940 policy.

B. Trends in Political Policy

Although political considerations are paramount in FCNL colonial attitudes, innovations in governmental organization have not progressed beyond the stage of discussion, suggestion, and the enunciation of broad principles for future action. The most far-reaching of the reforms projected by the Algiers authorities is the formation of a colonial union or federation which will give the overseas possessions a larger voice in Empire matters than hitherto enjoyed. In the debates of the Consultative Assembly and the discussions of the Brazzaville Conference, four schools of thought on this subject are discernible. The first of these, which may be considered as representing liberal opinion, is led by P-O Lapie, deputy of Meurthe et Moselle, former governor of the Tchad and, at present, rapporteur general of the Commission

---

1. French African Conference at Brazzaville (Restricted) CID 72226, 24 May 1944: 4. See also pp. 26-27.
2. JORF, 20 January 1944: 8.

of France d'Outre-Mer. This group advocates a plan of colonial union based essentially on the principle of association. Apparently influenced by the example of the British Commonwealth and the Soviet Union, Lapie projects a French Federation sufficiently elastic to include the North African protectorates. The scheme calls for a Federal Assembly composed of the delegates of the Metropole and the overseas possessions and endowed with legislative powers restricted to purely colonial matters.[1] Condemning the principle of assimilation, this group supports a plan for "Empire citizenship" as distinct from French citizenship, thereby obviating the difficulties which have arisen from the opposition of certain native groups to surrendering their personal status based on tribal or religious customs.[2]

A second group led by the Communists supports the Federation proposal but on the basis of a vigorous assimilation policy. Speaking in behalf of the Communist Party in the Consultative Assembly, M. Mercier has declared that the "French Republic, Metropole and overseas possessions, is one and indivisible" and must "comprise citizens free and equal in rights." To govern the new France, he has suggested a two-house parliament consisting of a Metropolitan chamber of deputies and a colonial assembly replacing the pre-war Senate. These two chambers will be equal in authority and will legislate on Metropolitan as well as colonial matters.[3]

The third school represents the colonial official class and finds its expression in the Brazzaville Conference. While denouncing the system of colonial representation based on deputies and senators in the Metropolitan Parliament as inadequate and the Conseil Supérieur de la France d'Outre-Mer

1. La Quatrième République, 8 January 1944. Lapie, "France's Colonies," Spectator, 5 November 1943. JORF, 15 January 1944: 13-14.
2. Vallin, Charles. "Citoyens d'Empire," La Marseillaise, 15 January 1944.
3. JORF, 20 January 1944.

as ineffective, this group is inclined towards the maintenance of the dominant authority of France in the overseas Empire. It favors the creation of a Federal Assembly but has expressed opposition to the term "French Federation" probably because it implies the equality of the dependencies with the Metropole and therefore the right of the member colonies to assume an independent attitude. In the view of this school, such a Federal Assembly must "guarantee the unbreakable unity of the French World," and the division of authority between the central organism and the colonies must be strictly defined.[1]

Lastly, the European colonials and even the French citizens of native descent, have opposed any change in policy. With the exception of the delegate from French Equatorial Africa, none of the colonial delegates to the Consultative Assembly has spoken in favor of the federation plan. M. Bourgoin of Indo-China stressed the political backwardness of the natives as a barrier to such a scheme. Along with M. Manuel Fell of West Africa and M. Girot of Madagascar, he expressed preference for the pre-1940 system of colonial representation in the Metropolitan Parliament.[2] The opposition of this colonial group may be attributed to the fear that the innovation may submerge the French group in the overwhelming native majorities.

While differences of opinion as well as the temporary nature of its administration have prevented the FCNL from drawing up a definitive plan, it appears that the post-war French Empire will receive some sort of federal structure. On 7 December 1943, the FCNL made a formal declaration to the Indo-Chinese Union pledging a "new political statute by which, within the French community and within the framework of the federal organization, the franchise of the different

1. French African Conference, CID 72226, 24 May 1944: 2-4.
2. JORF, 20 January 1944: 1.

countries of the Union will be reshaped and established on a wider scope...."[1] The plan devised by the Algiers authorities for the reorganization of public powers in France provides for the representation of all the overseas dependencies in the Constituent Assembly according to regulations to be laid down by the Provisional Assembly.[2] The colonies are thus assured of a voice in the deliberations which probably will settle the federation question.

The colonial delegates to the Consultative Assembly have shown far more interest in securing measures relieving the dependencies of strict supervision by the Metropole than in any schemes for federation.[3] While the declaration to Indo-China passes over this important point, the Brazzaville Conference stated its desire to see the colonies "progress from administrative centralization to political personality."[4] Apparently, however, this statement refers only to the delegation of authority to the colonial governors and their subordinates and to the setting up of a legislative regime in which the central authority will consider the needs of each individual colony rather than strive for the uniformity characteristic of earlier periods. With the exception of recommending that the governor be given the right to expel undesirable Frenchmen from the colony and to negotiate, in limited cases, with officials of neighboring colonies, the African Conference made no attempt to define any additional grant of powers to colonial administrators.[5]

---

1. Document Series III, No. 11 E, 14 December 1943.
2. JORF, 22 April 1944: 325.
3. JORF, 15 January 1944: 17-19 and 20 January 1944: 1.
4. French African Conference, CID 72226, 24 May 1944: 3.
5. Ibid. 35-36.

In French Equatorial Africa, the late Governor-General Félix Eboué, who inspired many of the colonial changes advocated by the Brazzaville Conference, took some steps in the direction of administrative decentralization. In a circular letter of 19 January 1941, the French chiefs of territory were given the authority to issue regulations touching on health and native labor.[1] Moreover, under Eboué's influence, the FCNL inaugurated a system giving a certain amount of autonomy to the colonies in budgetary matters.[2] Nevertheless, there is little reason to attribute to the Algiers authorities the aim of decentralizing colonial administration to the point where only questions of general policy will be referred to the central government.[3]

In the matter of colonial councils, the Brazzaville Conference has suggested changes which represent a distinct advance for the less privileged colonies. In place of existing administrative councils, the Brazzaville plan calls for representative assemblies composed of Europeans and natives elected where possible by universal suffrage and, failing this, by co-option. These colonial councils, the composition of which again reflects the influence of the "association" approach to colonial problems are to be granted deliberative powers in matters involving the budget and the establishing of public works. In questions arising from the legislative and regulatory powers conferred on the governor, the functions of these representative assemblies are consultative.[4] According to Pleven, the beginnings of assemblies of this type are to be found in the Cameroons Consultative Economic and Financial Assembly in which both Europeans and natives are represented.[5]

---

1. Law and Administration in French Equatorial Africa, R and A No. 106, 23 December 1943: 3.
2. Foreign Policy Bulletin, September 1943: 4.
3. Ibid.
4. French African Conference, CID 72226, 24 May 1944: 5.
5. JORF, 25 March 1944: 5.

This system of representative bodies, if adopted, will probably be extended to the politically undeveloped Pacific colonies. In functions, these assemblies resemble the departmental councils of France and the colonial councils of the assimilated possessions such as Senegal. While carrying a promise of reducing existing inequalities between the dependencies, this measure does little to advance colonial democracy in the sense of local self-government.

The general tendencies of FCNL colonial action in the area of governmental policy diverges from pre-war patterns only in the emphasis which is being placed on the formation of a French federation. Despite claims that it represents the application of a new principle of association, the federation plan is only an extension of the long-established concept of France d'Outre-Mer, and undoubtedly has been advanced with the idea of presenting France to the world as a "nation of one hundred million souls." As for the actualities of colonial government, there is little in FCNL action that even anticipates a change in outlook. The extension of the authority of the colonial governors, as has been indicated, entails no great relaxation of central control. While the projected reforms in the administrative councils of the African and, perhaps, the Pacific colonies forecast representative bodies with deliberative powers previously held only in the more advanced possessions, there is little reason to believe that local colonial government will become increasingly autonomous. FCNL political policy reflects the pledge contained in De Gaulle's speech of 27 May 1943 when, in anticipation of the establishment of the Algiers Committee, he declared that the basis of French colonial authority would be the "real sovereignty of France throughout the Empire." [1]

---

1. PW Weekly, No. 5, 4 June 1943.

C. Trends in Native Policy

The significant reforms accomplished or projected by the FCNL lie mostly in the realms of native policy and economic organization. In view of the weakened condition of France, the immediate concern of the Algiers authorities has been the integrity of the Empire. They have probably realized that the most effective means at their disposal for defending this integrity is the formulation of a native policy which will claim the loyalty of the indigenous populations by convincing them that the possibilities of political, cultural, and economic development will be greater under France than under any other imperial power. As has been indicated, the revival of North African nationalist movements, which carry distinct threats to French Empire security, caused the FCNL to inaugurate projects of reform.

The basis of the Algerian reform program was laid down by General de Gaulle in his Constantine speech of 12 December 1943 in which he announced the decision of the FCNL to extend French citizenship to certain categories of Moslems without the loss of personal status and to increase the representation of the Arabs on the various Algerian local councils.[1] On the recommendation of a commission composed of French citizens, natives, Algerian officials, and members of the Consultative Assembly, the FCNL enacted the ordinance of 7 March 1944 conferring citizenship on an estimated 60,000 Moslem Arabs. Reflecting the influence of the Communists, who had advocated the program before the Moslem Commission, the categories of elite endowed with citizenship included, in addition to the holders of educational diplomas, government positions, etc., certain members of the syndical councils and of the regional and administrative bodies of the Sociétés Indigenes de Prévoyance.[2]

1. Document Series II, 339 E, 21 December 1943.
2. Liberté, 31 December 1943. OSS 26719, 25 March 1944.

In addition, the legislation provides that the "French Moslems of Algeria" shall enjoy the rights and assume the duties of "French non-Moslems." In stating that the remainder of the Moslem population is to be prepared for citizenship, the 7 March ordinance stipulates that all males of twenty-one years and over shall have the right to vote for the special Moslem representatives to the municipal and general councils and to the Délégations Financières. The proportion of Moslems to Europeans in these governmental bodies which formerly was fixed at one-third was raised to two-fifths.[1]

Despite the intent of the FCNL to preserve the hegemony of the European element by such concessions to native opinion, the Algerian reform program has raised considerable opposition among the "colons" who fear that its future extension will bring the collapse of their economic and political domination.[2] In the Conseil Général of Algiers, recent political maneuvers designed to discredit the FCNL and the Consultative Assembly may be traced to this group which desires a return to the "safer" practices of the Third Republic.[3] For reasons similar to those of the French colons, Henri de Kerillis has condemned the Moslem legislation as an illegal assumption of political power, the results of which may be the "death knell of French colonial power."[4] Although Arab leaders view the concession only as a first step in a broader reform program, this Moslem legislation has contributed to the establishment of more amicable relations between the natives and the French Committee. On the first anniversary of the Manifesto of the Algerian people,[5] Ferhat Abbas summoned the Arabs to unite for the victory of the democracies and for Algeria "united to revolutionary France."

1. JORF, 18 March 1944: 217-218.
2. OSS 26179, 25 March 1944.
3. R and A No. 1121.67, 8 July 1944.
4. Pour la Victoire, 23 December 1943.
5. See above page 20.

Although some success has been achieved in securing for the Algerian miners the benefits of Metropolitan legislation on the mining industry, the further pledges made by the FCNL for the application to Moslems of the social legislation enjoyed by Europeans and for the wider diffusion of education still remain in the "discussion stage."[1] The same is true of the general reforms in native administration projected for Tunisia and Morocco. In Morocco, the Algiers authorities, through M. Puaux, the Resident General, have established commissions to study ways and means of increasing the number of Moslems employed in the government services, codifying the laws along lines that will respect native customs as far as possible, and increasing the educational facilities of the Protectorate.[2] In Tunisia, FCNL action has been confined largely to promises of social legislation benefiting the Arab populations and of increased openings in government service for members of the native elite.[3] The slow process of reform in the protectorates apparently is due to the involved nature of the relations between France and the native governments as well as to a natural French reluctance to initiate changes which will encourage the already strong independence tendencies.

While FCNL reform in Algeria has been along lines which re-emphasize the pre-1939 ideal of native assimilation, the pledges to Indo-China reflect the policy of association which the Third Republic inaugurated in this area. The declaration of 7 December 1943 to Indo-China anticipates the grant of a status within which "institutions will have a more liberal character without losing the features of Indo-Chinese tradition and civilization." In conjunction with the expressed intention of extending the franchise in this colony, the Algiers

1. L'Echo d'Alger, 24 January 1944.
2. Dépeche Algérienne, 17 February 1944.
3. Document Series II, 414, 5 January 1944. Airgram Tunis, 17 April 1944.

Committee has promised the natives access to every position and every public office of the possession. This document which refers to the "Indo-Chinese citizens" may be predicated on some remote idea of the ultimate assimilation of the Indo-Chinese along lines that have already been laid down for Arabs of Algeria.[1]

The principles of native policy outlined at Brazzaville for the relatively backward African colonies have been attributed to Félix Eboué who, having become Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa in 1940, set about the revamping of native administration on the basis of "indirect rule," the prevailing theory of native government in the British possessions. In a circular letter of 19 January 1941, Eboué expressed the belief that the sole means of maintaining order and preserving native existence in the African colonies lay in the promotion of native political institutions and the retention of legitimate and traditional chiefs. Even though these chiefs might be abusive in the exercise of their authority, he believed that they should be supported.[2] In a later circular he advocated the development of native customary law free from the influence of European judicial concepts, and M. Gabriel Fortuné, Governor of the Moyen-Congo, who was undoubtedly influenced by the theories of his chief, opposed the codification of native law because it would handicap its evolution. Both Eboué and Fortuné were convinced that the native should be a "good African" rather than a poor Frenchman.[3]

The Governor-General of Equatorial Africa believed the progress of the African native to be dependent on work and education. He favored compulsory labor with penalties imposed

---

1. Document Series III, 11 E, 14 December 1943.
2. JOAEF, 1941: 86-90. Law and Administration in AEF, R and A No. 106, 23 December 1942: 17.
3. France, 24 December 1941.

for the breach of contract, a system deprecated by the International Labor Office. In the matter of migrant labor, Eboué emphasized the necessity of maintaining the family circle and of halting the tendency to a declining birth rate by making provisions for the wife and children to accompany the worker.[1] In extending the educational facilities of his colony, the Governor-General sought the assistance of the Catholic and Protestant missions. By subsidizing the missions' schools, he broadened the basis of instruction in Equatorial Africa with obvious economies for the colonial government.[2]

With the added emphasis on industrial development, Eboué had to take into consideration the growth of an urban proletariat which would be further advanced politically and culturally than the rural masses. This consideration influenced the decree of 29 July 1942 which created a class of native notables évolues standing midway between the French citizen class and the native subjects. By this decree the status of évolue is conferred by the Governor-General on males of eighteen years or older who, together with other accomplishments, are able to read, write, and speak French fluently. Released from the penalties of the indigénat, but subject to native customary law, this elite group has the privilege of electing members to the local administrative councils. Likewise, the native delegates to the territorial Conseil des Interets are appointed from the ranks of the notables évolues.[3]

The principles and practices of Eboué's Equatorial African regime, contrary to general belief, had little influence upon the results of the Brazzaville Conference. The African governors accepted the principle of indirect rule or association only as a method of achieving the ultimate aim of assimilation, despite

1. France, 21 December 1941.
2. CID 59226, 1 December 1943.
3. Law and Administration in AEF, R and A No. 106, 23 December 1941: 31-32.

the strong condemnation of the latter principle in some circles of the Consultative Assembly. While emphasizing the maintenance of traditional political institutions as a means of advancing native responsibility, the Conference entertained the view that the solution of the African problem consists in "seeking the surest method to cause the native masses to evolve in the direction of a closer and closer assimilation to the principles which constitute the common basis of French civilization, and more particularly to start it on the road towards political responsibility."[1] In further suggesting that emphasis be placed on the development of a native elite, based on the Equatorial African decree of 1941 and extended to include artisans and workers, it merely stressed anew the main outlines of the pre-1939 policy. From this native elite are to be elected delegates to newly created local and regional councils whose functions will be limited to advising the territorial chiefs in matters of administration.[2]

In order to facilitate the progress of the natives along political and cultural as well as economic lines, the African governors have recommended a system of selective immigration imposing specific health, educational and, in some cases, financial qualifications on those desiring to settle in the colonies. It is believed that this carefully selected colonial class will cooperate with the natives in achieving their mutual well-being and the development of the colony. While advocating the gradual opening of all types of employment to the indigenous elements, the Conference was agreed that the immediate future requires the restriction of all positions of "command and direction" to French citizens.[3] According to press interpretations of this Brazzaville

1. French African Conference, CID 72226, 24 May 1944: 11.
2. Ibid. 5, 12.
3. French African Conference, CID 72226, 24 May 1944: 7.

recommendation, the European settlers are to be utilized not only as teachers and officials but also as economic leaders in pursuits which are chiefly industrial, the agricultural development of the colony being left largely to natives. In recruiting this personnel, the African governors rejected a proposal that preference be given to war veterans and declared that for this important task the "colonies must be able to count on the younger generation of the Resistance which will find overseas tasks worthy of its strength and of its ability."[1] The appeal to Resistance, which has been widely publicized in the Algiers press, presents this phase of colonial development somewhat in the light of a national crusade in the interests of the world power of France. The policy of immigration has been criticized in official circles only because of its restrictive character and its emphasis on quality rather than quantity which some believe to be necessary for a fuller and more rapid colonial development.[2]

A second measure adopted at Brazzaville for advancing the development of the natives is designed to correct one of the failures of the pre-1939 policy. An elaborate system of education has been recommended that will give equal importance to the instruction of the masses and the elite, and of girls as well as boys. The Cameroons has devised a program of giving primary education to 375,000 children in a period of fifteen years, West Africa to 475,000 in twenty years, and Equatorial Africa to 500,000 in forty years. Primary schools are to be established in every community which has 50 children of school age. Accompanying this long-range program of elementary education, there are suggestions for the creation of technical and trade schools as well as normal schools. In excluding the use of dialects in teaching and emphasizing French not only as the "sole linguistic vehicle

1. Ibid. 10. Pour la Victoire, 19 February 1944. France (London) 3 February 1944.
2. CID 71391, 12 February 1944.

but also as the language of intellectual and moral formation," the Conference expressed clearly the ultimate goal of assimilation.[1]

The Brazzaville Conference also includes in its report a series of recommendations on tribal customs, native justice, and health and hygiene. Certain practices such as polygamy and the abject subordination of women are to be abolished. As regards native justice, the theories of Eboué received scant consideration. In advocating the retention of native customs in judging civil and commercial matters only "for the moment," the Conference implied its wish to abolish the practice. The African governors favored the drafting of a penal code on the West African model and expressed the hope that such a code might become common to the entire African Continent. The abolition of the indigénat "from the end of hostilities" was foreseen.[2]

In matters of labor policy, the Conference expressed confidence in the principle of freedom of work but granted a delay of five years for the cessation of compulsory labor. At the International Labor Conference in Philadelphia, the French delegates argued that the shortage of goods and lack of transportation facilities made it impossible to establish a definite date for the abolition of the compulsory system.[3] Nor did the Brazzaville Conference completely abandon the system of forced work. It recommended that young men between twenty and twenty-one years of age who are eligible for military service but who are not called shall undergo a year of compulsory labor restricted to public works.

In the field of health, the African governors made their only definite proposal for international action. On the basis

1. JORF, 15 March 1944: 2.
2. French African Conference, CID 72226: 17.
3. International Labor Conference, 1944, Provisional Record No. 25.

of an exchange of views between France and foreign powers, they recommended the establishment, in conjunction with the other African powers, of a joint board of health for the purpose of exchanging medical information and of controlling disease.[1]

The direction taken by the FCNL native policy as a whole presents more similarities than contrasts with the principles if not the practices of pre-war policy. As an implementation of the inherited principle of assimilation, the Moslem reform program extended the grant of citizenship originally projected in the Blum-Violette scheme of 1937. The Brazzaville proposals of African reform are based on the same principle but, in giving a limited approval to the policy of assimilation as a method, they depart from the practices of the Third Republic. The broad program for educational reform and the plan for an extensive but restricted immigration hold a promise of a more vigorous effort to bring the native masses to a higher stage of development.

It is unlikely that this long-term program will be fully carried out. In view of the apparently sharp decline which has taken place in the Metropolitan population and the vast energies which will be required for the reconstruction of the liberated homeland, the possibility of recruiting a sufficient colonial cadre from the resistance youth is none too bright. It is doubtful, too, whether the new France will be able to allocate to the colonies the funds necessary to realize their vast educational programs. The progress of the dependencies along the lines laid down at the Brazzaville Conference may be accomplished only by a sacrifice and self-denial which has not characterized French home opinion with regard to colonial matters. Failing this, colonial advancement will be determined by the extent to which economic reforms will produce the prosperity enabling each possession to underwrite its necessary expenses.

1. JORF, 15 March 1944: 3.

D. Trends in Economic Policy

The Algiers press and other French information services have placed far more stress on the needs and accomplishments of native administration than on similar efforts in colonial economic organization. That this is true is due not only to the greater importance attached by the French to native reform, but also to the actual paucity of FCNL action in the economic problems of the Empire. Nevertheless, the views expressed by the colonial delegates to the Consultative Assembly reflect the importance which the dependencies attach to the re-orientation of economic policy. The representatives from the overseas Empire have demanded reforms extending all the way from the familiar themes of increased industrialization and customs autonomy to a new note of emphasis on the necessity of curtailing those big business enterprises accused of reaping rich profits from the colonies without returning equivalent benefits.[1]

Because of the impossibility of undertaking any far-reaching economic improvement during the period of war, the FCNL has initiated few innovations to meet the economic problems. In Tunis it has approved General Mast's paysannat scheme of settling landless Arabs on small holdings and in other parts of Africa it has encouraged industrialization on a small scale as well as a more intensive agriculture.[2] Other than the pledge to grant customs autonomy to Indo-China for facilitating its trade relations with China, the Algiers Committee has made few pronouncements on matters of colonial economy.[3] Considering the general economic backwardness of all the French colonies and dependencies, the recommendations and proposals of the Brazzaville Conference

1. JORF, 15 January 1944 and 20 January 1944.
2. Airgram, Tunis, 8 May 1944. Dépeche Algérienne, 17 February 1944. Document Series II, No. 836E, 19 April 1944.
3. Document Series III, No. 11E, 14 December 1944.

may be accepted as reflecting the general view of the FCNL on economic change throughout the empire.

At Brazzaville the African governors expressed themselves in favor of a planned economy involving the mise en valeur of the colonies from the point of view of the economic potentialities of each dependency rather than of the needs of the Metropole. In encouraging industry as an integral part of the colonies' economic effort, they underlined the necessity of a gradual and planned development carried out under the supervision and auspices of the colonial government concerned.[1] Although it referred to the principle of private initiative, the conference recommended that colonial governments aid such efforts by "taking charge of the pioneer factories" during the period of industrial infancy, by supporting industries whose operation is unprofitable but whose products are vital to the territory, and by establishing research laboratories to aid manufacturing techniques.[2] This seeming emphasis on a state-controlled if not a state-owned industry has aroused some protest in colonial quarters.[3] The tendency towards state control is further emphasized in a recommendation that, in the interest of price equilibrium, the selling of goods and the division of markets be carried out under a system of commercial centralization.[4]

The improvement of colonial agriculture likewise is to take place under a mise en valeur plan based on the particular crop adaptabilities of each colony. This improvement is projected under a system of colonial centralization which will provide agencies to study plans for the

1. JORF, 15 March 1944: 3.
2. French African Conference, CID 72226, 24 May 1944: 29.
3. CID 71391, 12 February 1944.
4. JORF, 15 March 1944: 3.

restoration of soil fertility and the control of erosion. To meet the needs for farm machinery, the African governors have recommended the adoption of co-operative farming methods based on Russian models.[1] Lastly, the Brazzaville Conference recognized the need of a customs regime that could be adjusted to a variable world economy and to the particular economic or geographic situation of the individual colony. Hence, it recommended the grant of tariff "personality," but not customs autonomy, to the dependencies. Its pronouncement on this point states that "customs duties, free entry, and prohibition of entry or exit should be fixed by the deliberations of the qualified council in each colony or territory, these deliberations to be approved by decree, countersigned by the minister of colonies alone, after consultation with the ministerial departments concerned, failure to make a decision in three months being equivalent to ratification."[2]

The recommended grant of tariff personality to the colonies reflects the adverse economic situation in the French overseas Empire. Dependent on the United States and England for products formerly coming from France, the tariff barriers of the colonies have already been lowered to meet the needs of the new situation. With the final economic recovery of France lying some years in the future, it is easily understandable why General de Gaulle in his Brazzaville speech declared that France had no "desire to pursue overseas aims by closing its territories behind barriers which would isolate them from the rest of the world."[3]

While little has been done thus far to implement the Brazzaville economic program, the industrial, agricultural, and tariff innovations which have been proposed correspond more

1. French African Conference, CID 72226: 33.
2. Ibid. 34.
3. France (London) 1 February 1944.

than any other projected Empire change to the immediate and realizable needs of France and the colonies. Therefore, there is little reason to doubt that they will be carried out in the early post-war years. To what extent they will remain a permanent feature of French colonial organization will depend on the rapidity with which France regains its former status as a world power and on the direction taken by world economy in the years to come.

V. CONCLUSION

With the exception of the Moslem Ordinance of 7 March 1943, the Algiers Committee has enacted little legislation that may be interpreted as marking a departure from pre-war policies. The significant features of FCNL colonial action are not to be found in concrete measures of legislation but in the recommendations and principles adopted for the post-war reconstruction of the Empire. These recommendations and principles are by no means revolutionary and, for the most part, diverge from pre-1939 colonial rule in practice rather than in theory.

The extent to which the future government of France will attempt the implementation of FCNL pronouncements on colonial reorganization will depend, in large part, on the political composition of the new Parliament. The Algiers Committee has reflected tendencies and views that are usually associated with the "Left." It is probably the Resistance movement within France, however, that will be the decisive influence in the setting up of the new colonial regime. Thus far, the Resistance groups have given almost no expression to their attitudes on Empire matters. Whether their views will coincide with those of the FCNL is a moot question.

Regardless of the composition of the new French Government, however, the weakened political and economic situation of France together with the new importance of the

colonies will impose some measures of reform in the Empire. While the FCNL program may not be adopted in its entirety, it doubtless will serve as the basis of Empire reconstruction.